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perfected status, and thus could not pre-
vail over the trustee's inclusion into the 
bankrupt's estate. On July 1, 1971 
§9-401 was amended to change the 
proper place for filing' a financial state-
ment from the circuit courts to the State 
Department of Assessments and Taxation. 
Instead of filing the third statement with 
the Department, the creditor acted as he 
had the first two instances and filed this 
final statement with the Circuit Court. 
The basic issue here was whether the final 
statement modified the earlier filings. In 
rejection of the trustee's argument, the 
court conceded that the third filing was 
ineffective, but that under §9-401 (d) such 
error had no effect on the properly filed 
statements. 
Court Shoots 
Down 
Air Force 
by Thomas G. Ross 
Lawrence C. Dominic, Esq. 
The August 30, 1977 decision in Mead 
Data Central, Inc. v. United States 
Department of the Air Force, et 0/. (No. 
75-2218), __ U.S.App.D.C. __ , 
__ F.2d __ , concerned the' ap-
plicability and scope of exemption five of 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 
U.s.c. §552(b)(5)(1970 Supp. V 1975). 
The appellant appealed from a summary 
judgment in favor of the Air Force in 
which the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia denied Mead Data's re-
quest for an injunction to compel the Air 
Force to disclose the contents of seven 
documents relating to a licensing agree-
ment between the Air Force and the West 
Publishing Company. The court held that 
the requested documents were not subject 
to disclosure because the fifth of nine ex-
emptions enumerated within the FOIA 
speCifically protected the Air Force 
against mandatory release of the docu-
ments. 
Enacted in 1966, the FOIA was in-
tended to increase public access to 
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government records and to encourage 
agency responsibility. Congress, through 
the Act, changed its policy from one 
favoring nondisclosure of governmental 
information (under the Administrative 
Procedure Act [APA] of 1946) to one of 
mandatory disclosure. Whereas the APA 
was very restrictive and often abused, re-
quiring access only to "persons properly 
and directly concerned" with the matter, 
the FOIA mandates disclosure of identifia-
ble governmental records to "any person" 
requesting them, subject to the nine 
specific exemptions, and provides for 
judicial remedy for a government agen-
cy's improper withholding of information. 
86 HARv. L. REV. 1047-1048 (1973). 
The United States Supreme Court in 
N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 421 
U.S. 132 (1975), held that the "purpose 
of the [FOIA] is to establish a general 
philosophy of full agency disclosure 
unless information is exempted under 
clearly delineated statutory language" 
and that the Act's intent was to assure the 
public's right of access to virtually all 
governmental agency documents. The 
Court reiterated its position on the FOIA's 
function in Dept. of Air Force v. Rose, 
425 U.S. 352 (1976), holding that "dis-
closure, not secrecy, is the dominant ob-
jective of the Act." 
Congress did, however, recognize the 
need to allow government agencies the 
right of nondisclosure for certain docu-
ments. The information, to be protected, 
must be within one of the following nine 
specific exemptions: 
1. national defense or foreign policy 
interests; 
2. agency's internal personnel rules 
and practices; 
3. specific statutory exemption; 
4. trade secrets; 
5. inter-agency or intra-agency 
memoranda; 
6. invasion of personal privacy; 
7. investigatory files for law enforce-
ment purposes; 
8. regulation of financial institutions; 
and 
9. information concerning oil wells. 
See 5 U.s.c. §§552(b)(1) through (9). 
In Mead Data, the Air Force was suc-
cessful at the trial court level after assert-
ing a claim that the seven documents re-
quested by Mead Data were privileged in 
that they fell within exemption five of the 
FOIA. That exemption, at 5 U.s.C. 
§552(b)(5), states: 
[The Act does not apply to] inter-agen-
cy or intra-agency memoranda or let-
ters which would not be available by 
law to a party other than an agency in 
litigation with the agency. 
The broad and unclear language of ex-
emption five thrusts upon the courts a 
major role in the administration of the 
Act. 86 HARv. L. REV. at 1066-67 (1973). 
The two basic defense claims that can be 
made to invoke the privilege under this 
exemption are the attorney-client priv-
ilege and the privilege protecting those 
memoranda involved in the deliberation 
and deCision-making governmental pro-
cess. See generally C. M. Marvick (Ed.), 
Litigation Under the Amended Freedom 
of Information Act (ACLU 1976). 
The seven documents that Mead Data 
sought to have disclosed dealt with an Air 
Force project involving a computerized 
legal research system. Of these, the Air 
Force claimed that three were legal opin-
ions in which Air Force attorneys were ad-
vising their client as to applicable law 
concerning contract negotiations. The Air 
Force further asserted that the other four 
documents were privileged as internal 
memoranda prepared by its employees. 
Mead Data argued that the information 
requested was purely factual and thus 
subject to disclosure, while the Air Force 
asserted that it consisted of adViSory opin-
ions and deliberations protected from dis-
closure by exemption five. 
The circuit court agreed with the trial 
court's ruling that both the attorney-client 
and deliberative process privileges are in-
corporated into exemption five. However, 
it reversed the judgment of the district 
court due to its "impermissibly broad in-
terpretation" of these privileges and re-
manded for a decision based on narrower 
constructions outlined in the case. No. 
75-2218 slip op. at 34. The court noted 
that the congressional intent was that the 
exemption be applied "as narrowly as 
consistent with efficient government 
operation." Id., at 11, n. 16; S. Rep. No. 
813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965). 
ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
While the court viewed this privilege as 
necessary to maintain the quality and in-
dependence of agency decision-making, it 
ordered the disclosure of the three docu-
ments on remand unless the Air Force 
could meet its burden by sufficient dem-
onstration of the applicability of the priv-
ilege to this situation. Agreeing that the 
documents were products of the attorney-
client relationship, the court, however, 
refused to hold them exempt under the 
privilege absent a showing by the Air 
Force that one document was confidential 
in itself and that two others were based on 
confidential information provided by the 
client. In the first case, one document 
sought to be withheld was known and dis-
closed to parties outside of the attorney-
client relationship (West Publishing Co.); 
as to the other two the Air Force sought 
to protect under the privilege theory, it 
was found that they were not based on in-
formation "supplied by the Air Force with 
the expectation of secrecy." Id. at 14-18. 
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE 
(Internal Memoranda) 
This privilege turns on the distinction 
between information which is essentially 
factual and documents involving delibera-
tion and policy-making. The Supreme 
Court held that the former requires dis-
closure, EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 72 
(1973), while documents revealing agen-
cy policy making and deliberative pro-
cesses may be withheld. Id. at 19-20. 
Of the four documents the Air Force 
sought to withhold under this privilege, 
one was found to be exempt from dis-
closure. As to two others, the court stated 
that its policy of "promoting the free flow 
of ideas" protected from disclosure those 
parts of the documents reflecting the 
opinions of Air Force employees concern-
ing the status of negotiations with West. 
Slip op. at 22. The court found that the 
fourth document, dealing with various 
offers and counter-offers by both West 
and the Air Force, was not exempt simply 
because it reflected "negotiating posi-
tions" prior to a final contract. While such 
deliberations within an agency structure 
are protected, those involving an outside 
party are not. The court remanded to 
compel disclosure of this document and 
any parts of the others dealing with 
specific negotiations with West. Id. at 
22-24. 
SEGREGABILITY 
The court went on to hold that the Air 
Force had not adequately justified its 
claim that the requested documents con-
tained no non-exempt information that 
could be ·"reasonably segregable" from 
that information the Air Force asserted to 
be privileged under exemption five. The 
court further directed that an agency is re-
quired to provide an adequate description 
of a document's content and its reasons 
for belieVing the information to be non-
segregable before refUSing to disclose. Id. 
at 2. 
"The focus of the FOIA is information, 
not documents, and an agency cannot 
justify withholding an entire document 
simply by showing it contains some ex-
empt material." Slip op. at 27-28. 
On remand, the Air Force was ordered 
to provide a detailed justification for with-
holding the seven documents. In addition, 
the court stated that a further requirement 
of a party asserting that the information in 
a document was not segregable from ex-
empted information is a description of the 
portion of information contained in a file 
that is non-exempt and how that informa-
tion is dispersed throughout the entire 
document. The court reasoned that this 
information would better enable a court 
to establish the validity of an agency's 
assertion that non-privileged information 
was not segregable from that which was 
exempt. Id. at 29-30, 34. 
A narrow construction of exemption 
five places it in its proper context. For the 
attorney-client privilege to possess any 
gravity it must be circumscribed to pro-
tect communication between the lawyer 
and her client which is made with reliance 
on secrecy. The expectation of confiden-
tiality is often a condition precedent to 
any communication at all. Where parties' 
deliberations are protected to permit the 
"free flow of ideas" without threat of dis-
closure, opinion making and discussion 
flourishes. In the agency milieu, however, 
that crucial expectation of confidentiality 
is limited. Where attorney-client con-
sultations demand secrecy in order to 
meet an objective, and where administra-
tive deliberations must be confidential to 
avoid a chill on the "free flow of ideas," 
the exemption shall apply. Not intended 
by the Congress was protection of the 
mundane communication within the agen-
cy context, information necessarily sub-
ject to examination by third parties or the 
frustration of the public's reasonable right 
to access to information of its govern-
ment. 
Prejudicial 
Joinder 
by John Jeffrey Ross 
John Lee McKnight was arrested and 
accused of committing four robberies 
within the same area of Baltimore during 
a single month in 1974. After an unsuc-
cessful motion to sever the informations 
joined in a single prosecution under Mary-
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